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Abstract
The productive efficiency of a firm can be decomposed into two parts,
one persistent and one transient. So far, most of the cost efficiency studies
estimated frontier models that provide either the transient or the persistent
part of productive efficiency. This distinction seems to be appealing also
for regulators. During the last decades, public utilities such as water and
electricity have witnessed a wave of regulatory reforms aimed at improving
efficiency through incentive regulation. Most of these regulation schemes
use benchmarking, namely measuring companies’ efficiency and rewarding
them accordingly. The purpose of this study is to assess the level of persis-
tent and transient efficiency in an electricity sector and to investigate their
implications under price cap regulation. Using a theoretical model, we show
that an imperfectly informed regulator may not disentangle the two parts
of the cost efficiency; therefore, they may fail in setting optimal efficiency
targets. The introduction of minimum quality standards may not offer a
valid solution. To provide evidence we use data on 28 New Zealand elec-
tricity distribution companies between 1996 and 2011. We estimate a total
cost function using three stochastic frontier models for panel data. We start
with the random effects model (RE) proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) that
provides information on the persistent part of the cost efficiency. Then, we
apply the true random effects model (TRE) proposed by Greene (2005a,
2005b) that provides information on the transient part. Finally, we use the
generalized true random effects model (GTRE) that allows for the simulta-
neous estimation of both transient and persistent efficiency. We find weak
evidence that persistent efficiency is associated to higher quality, and wrong
efficiency targets are associated to lower quality compliance.
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tive efficiency, electricity distribution.
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1 Introduction
During the last twenty years, several countries around the world have intro-
duced reforms in public utility sectors, such as water, electricity and telecom-
munications. Regarding electricity, two key elements of these reforms are the
introduction of competition in the supply and generation of electricity, and the
introduction of new regulation methods in the transmission and distribution of
electricity considered as natural monopolies. The new methods apply the incen-
tive regulation theory (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). They provide incentives for
productive efficiency by compensating the company with its savings. The main
categories of incentive-based schemes used for electricity utilities are price or
revenue caps, sliding-scale rate of return, partial cost adjustment, menu of con-
tracts, and yardstick regulation.1 Several of these methods used by regulation
authorities make use of information on the level of productive efficiency of an
electricity distribution company, i.e. technical and cost efficiency. For instance,
the New Zealand regulation authority for the electricity distribution sector has
adopted a price-cap regulation scheme.
As discussed in Filippini and Greene (2015), the level of productive efficiency
of a firm can be decomposed into two parts, one persistent and one transient. The
presence of structural problems in the organization of the production process or
systematic shortfalls in managerial capabilities can generate the persistent part.
Conversely, the presence of non-systematic management problems in the short
term determines the transient part. For the regulator it is crucial to distinguish
between these two types of inefficiency, and to choose measurement methods of
productive efficiency that provide information on both persistent and transient
components.
So far none of the regulation authorities around the world that are using infor-
mation on the level of productive efficiency of electricity distribution companies
in the regulation process make a distinction between persistent and transient
inefficiency. The reasons are twofold. First, only recently have some scholars
introduced this distinction. Secondly, the empirical measurement of these two
components of the level of productive efficiency is still in a development phase.
However, the literature on the estimation of the productive efficiency that does
1See Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) for a review of regulation models.
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not distinguish the two components is abundant.2
A few studies analyze the level of cost efficiency of the New Zealand electricity
distribution companies. None of these studies makes any distinction of the two
components of productive efficiency, i.e. transient and persistent. Scully (1999)
analyzes the impact of privatization on the level of cost efficiency using a sample
of electricity distribution companies operating in New Zealand. The author
proposes the estimation of a translog total cost function using data from 1982 to
1994. The results show that privatization produces substantial cost reductions.
Filippini and Wetzel (2014) assess the cost efficiency of 28 New Zealand electricity
distribution companies for the period between 1996 and 2011. The authors
estimate a total cost function and a variable cost function using a stochastic
frontier model with panel data. The goal of this study is to evaluate the impact
of ownership unbundling on the level of cost efficiency. The results suggest that
ownership separation of electricity generation and retail operations from the
distribution network have positive effects on the level of cost efficiency.3
The goals of this paper are twofold. First, it sketches a theoretical model
that shows the importance of the distinction between persistent and transient
inefficiency in the application of a price-cap regulation method. Second, the
paper estimates the level of cost efficiency for a sample of 28 New Zealand elec-
tricity distribution companies by making the distinction between persistent and
transient levels of efficiency. The paper intends to contribute to the literature
in two ways. First, the theoretical model illustrates how to use information on
persistent and transient inefficiency effectively in a price-cap regulation setting.
Second, the paper provides one of the first empirical analyses to show the pres-
ence of persistent and transient inefficiency using a novel econometric approach
introduced by Filippini and Greene (2015). The results support the importance
of the distinction of productive efficiency into a persistent and a transient part
as depicted in the theoretical model.
We organize the paper as follows. Section 2 sketches a theoretical model that
investigates how regulation may fail when persistent and transient inefficiency
are ignored. Section 3 introduces the cost model specification and the estimation
2See Ramos-Real (2005) for a review of part of these studies.
3Nillesen and Pollitt (2011) also investigate the effect of ownership unbundling on electricity
distribution companies but their analysis focuses on the level of cost rather than the level cost
efficiency, and only considers variable costs.
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approaches, while Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5, we present and
discuss the estimation results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Persistent and transient inefficiency in a regulated
industry: a theoretical approach
To understand the implications of transient and persistent inefficiency of elec-
tricity distribution companies in New Zealand, we sketch a model where firms
maximize the current value of future profits under price cap regulation. In the
market there are N identical firms acting as local monopolies.4 Each firm chooses
price (pt) and service quality (qt) in each period t as well as the level of manage-
rial effort (et). Managerial effort allows obtaining efficiency gains only partially
exploitable in terms of cost reductions because of persistent inefficiency. We
show that the regulator cannot achieve optimal efficiency targets if imperfectly
informed on persistent inefficiency. Regulation failure may lead to postponed
expenditures, which worsens service quality, or increases in monopoly rents. In
addition, higher pressure to meet current minimum quality standards may un-
dermine a firm’s compliance and also result in delayed expenditures and poorer
quality in the future.5
Consider first the following demand for electricity distribution services faced
by each firm:
s(pt, qt) = qt (θ − pt) , (1)
where qt∈ (0,+∞) is service quality, pt is unit price, and θ is a parameter indi-
cating the reservation price for a unit of quality.
The following equation describes total costs at t:
c(et, et−j , pt, qt) = β + γs(pt, qt)− ET (et)− EP (et−j) + f(qt) + g(et), (2)
where β is a cost that depends on the size of the distribution network and γ is the
unit cost of electricity services (γ < θ). Both quality and managerial effort are
4In practice, firms are single-product monopolists. For a model of price cap regulation with
multi-market monopolists when the costs of serving different markets vary, see for instance
Cowan (1997a).
5Recently, Di Giorgio et al. (2015) proposed a theoretical approach to separate structural (or
institutional) inefficiency from managerial inefficiency in public and private nursing homes. The
model applies to a different regulatory setting - global budget instead of price cap regulation -
and does not elaborate on the implications for the regulatory mechanism.
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costly for the firm. Therefore, f(qt) = q
2
t /2 is the cost of quality and g(et) = e
2
t /2
is the cost of managerial effort.6 We assume increasing marginal costs of quality
and effort. Managerial effort allows to reach efficiency gains that reduce costs
in the current period by ET (et) = (1− α) et and EP (et−j) = αet−j . Since part
of the inefficiency persists over time, only a fraction (1− α) of current manage-
rial effort translates immediately into efficiency gains. The remaining fraction
(α) generates efficiency gains only in the future, at time t + j. Therefore, the
lagged efficiency effort EP (et−j) also reduces total costs in period t. Cost per-
sistency may arise for several reasons. For instance, management habits may
lead to inertia, which prevents improving tasks or solving problems immediately.
In addition, environmental and social constraints related to shareholders’ pref-
erences, access to inputs, or the fulfillment of legal rules may affect the timing
of efficiency gains. Finally, unions’ bargaining power may succeed in postponing
the achievement of efficiency targets. Therefore, in all these cases the effects of
managerial effort on cost reduction may be delayed.
The firm maximizes the current value of future economic profits in each
period. Therefore, the firm’s intertemporal profits at time t can be written as
Vt =
∞∑
t=k
δt−kpit (et, et−j , pt, qt) , (3)
where
pit (et, et−j , pt, qt) = pts(pt, qt)− c (et, et−j , pt, qt) , (4)
and δ ≤ 1 is the discount factor for future profits.
For comparison purposes, we first analyze the case where the firm is not
regulated. When choosing price, quality and efficiency effort each firm takes
into account the effects not only on its current period profits but also on its
demand and costs in the following periods. This dependence needs to be taken
into account when solving the model for the equilibrium levels of price, quality
and effort. Profits in period t depend upon efficiency effort in period t − j. In
addition, the value function represented by the flow of all future profits depends
on all future levels of price, quality and efficiency effort. In equilibrium the
firm selects price, quality and efficiency effort that maximize its intertemporal
6For instance, one can think to the cost of remunerating the performance of the manager
through an increase in the wage.
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profit given its subsequent choices of price, quality and efficiency effort. Because
efficiency effort affects profits in the subsequent period and expected profits are
the sum of concave functions in price, quality and efficiency effort, we can write
the following first-order conditions for the firm using Eqs. (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) as:
∂Vt
∂pt
=
∂pit(et,e∗t−j ,pt,qt)
∂pt
= qt(θ + γ)− 2qtpt = 0
∂Vt
∂et
=
∂pit(et,e∗t−j ,pt,qt)
∂et
+ δj
∂pit+j(e∗t+j ,et,p∗t+j ,q∗t+j)
∂et
=
= −et + (1− α) + δjα = 0
∂Vt
∂qt
=
∂pit(et,e∗t−j ,pt,qt)
∂qt
= (pt − γ) (θ − pt)− qt = 0.
(5)
Therefore, an equilibrium is defined by:7
p∗t =
θ+γ
2
e∗t = 1− α
(
1− δj)
q∗t =
(θ−γ)2
4 .
(6)
Note that the equilibrium level of efficiency effort is less than 1 since the
expected benefits of effort in terms of future cost reduction are affected by cost
persistency (α). However, in the extreme case of δ = 1, i.e. when future costs
are not discounted, persistency would not influence the choice of efficiency effort.
This is because the impact of efficiency effort on costs in different time periods
is the same.
Proposition 1 Firm’s efficiency effort decreases with persistent efficiency (α),
provided that the discount factor (δ) on future earnings is less than 1.
2.1 Price cap regulation
We now assume that the energy authority decides to introduce a price cap reg-
ulation, starting at t+ 1, and summarized by the following rule:
pt+1s(p
∗
t , q
∗
t )
p∗t s(p∗t , q∗t )
≤ CPIt+1
CPIt
−X, (7)
where CPIt+1 and CPIt are Consumer Price Indexes in period t + 1 and t,
respectively.8 X is the expected efficiency gain based on past performance or
7The second-order sufficient conditions are:
∂2V ∗t
∂p2t
= −2q∗t < 0, ∂
2V ∗t
∂e2t
=
∂2V ∗t
∂q2t
= −1 < 0,
∂2V ∗t
∂p2t
∂2V ∗t
∂e2t
− ∂2V ∗t
∂pt∂et
= 2q∗t > 0,
∂2V ∗t
∂p2t
∂2V ∗t
∂q2t
− ∂2V ∗t
∂pt∂qt
= 2 (q∗t + p
∗
t ) − (θ + γ) > 0, ∂
2V ∗t
∂e2t
∂2V ∗t
∂q2t
−
∂2V ∗t
∂et∂qt
= 1 > 0. These are satisfied for any γ < θ provided that θ ≥ 2.
8We consider a standard rule, though alternative price-cap schemes are possible. See Cowan
(1997b) for a comparison of different price-cap schemes in terms of allocative efficiency.
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average performance of other firms in the market.9 Let us assume that prices do
not inflate, i.e. CPIt+1 = CPIt. Therefore, the price cap rule in Eq. (7) can be
simplified as:
pt+1 ≤ p∗t (1−X) . (8)
2.1.1 Full information on efficiency structure
The least realistic scenario hypothesizes that the energy authority has full in-
formation about the efficiency structure.10 In other words, the regulator is fully
aware that part of the efficiency effort cannot translate into efficiency gains im-
mediately because of persistency. We start our analysis from the full information
case since this is the ideal scenario and can be used as a benchmark. To simplify
the analysis we now set unit costs at zero, therefore γ = 0.11
The firm’s maximization problem set by Eq. (3) and subject to the price cap
constraint defined by Eq. (8) leads to the following first-order conditions:12
∂Vt+1
∂pt+1
= qt+1θ − 2qt+1pt+1 − λ+ δλ (1−X) = 0
∂Vt+1
∂et+1
= −et+1 + (1− α) + δjα = 0
∂Vt+1
∂qt+1
= pt+1 (θ − pt+1)− qt+1 = 0
∂Vt+1
∂λ = pt+1 − p∗t (1−X) = 0,
(9)
where λ is the slack variable. The solution to the constrained maximization
problem is:
p∗t+1 = p∗t (1−X) = θ2 (1−X)
e∗t+1 = 1− α
(
1− δj)
q∗t+1 = p∗t (1−X) [θ − p∗t (1−X)] = θ
2
4 (1−X)2
λ∗ = q
∗
t+1θ−2q∗t+1p∗t+1
[1−δ(1−X)] =
θ3
4
(1−X)2X
[1−δ(1−X)] .
(10)
9See Bernstein and Sappington (1999) for a review of the relevant basic principles to deter-
mine the X factor.
10The problem of information acquisition under price cap regulation has been widely inves-
tigated in the literature. See Iossa and Stroffolini (2002) among others.
11From Eq. (6) we see that the marginal cost of electricity distribution affects price and
quality in equilibrium. However, the equilibrium level of efficiency effort is not affected. Since
we focus on the effects of persistent and transient components of efficiency, we avoid further
mathematical complications by assuming that marginal costs of electricity distribution are
negligible. Clearly, marginal costs of quality and efficiency effort are still present in the following
analysis.
12Note that we rule out any firm’s strategic behaviour that raises prices to anticipate future
constraints and influence efficiency targets. The model assumes that firms do not have infor-
mation on the timing of introduction of the new price cap regulation. This is equivalent to
assume that the regulator do not use the most recent information to set efficiency targets or
the discount factor on future profits is relatively large.
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From comparison with the unregulated solution in Eq. (6) we see that price
cap regulation reduces current price, as expected, because efficiency gains are in-
ternalized. In addition, price cap regulation decreases quality since the marginal
reward of quality increases is lower. Generally, this motivates the introduction
of additional regulatory mechanisms, such as minimum quality standards, that
will be later addressed in our analysis. Finally, note that efficiency effort is not
affected by the introduction of price cap regulation. This is because we assumed
separability between quality and efficiency effort in the cost function to simplify
the analysis. Moreover, firms do not know the relationship between the efficiency
target (X) set by the regulator and their own efficiency effort (e∗t ). Therefore,
efficiency targets are taken as exogenous. Again, this simplifies the analysis
and allows us to focus on the possible implications of transient and persistent
inefficiency under the price cap regime.
The regulator can set efficiency targets according to two main approaches.
The first approach estimates the efficiency target based on the efficiency effort
observed in some past period t− l: e∗t−l. Since the efficiency effort is the same in
all periods before the introduction of the price cap (see Eq. (6)), the authority
expects transient efficiency gains of EˆT = (1− α) e∗t−l = (1− α) e∗t . In addition,
because of persistent inefficiency, part of the current efficiency target can only
be achieved in period t+ 1 + j, when all the benefits generated by the efficiency
effort in period t+ 1 will be exploited. Therefore, in period t+ 1 the authority
expects persistent efficiency gains of EˆP = αe
∗
t−l−j = αe
∗
t .
As an alternative, in the second approach to efficiency targets, the regulator
can set the efficiency target based on the average efficiency effort observed in
other firms, e¯t. Given that firms are all identical, the authority expects tran-
sient efficiency gains of EˆT = (1− α) e¯t = (1− α) e∗t . The expected persistent
efficiency gains are EˆP = αe¯
∗
t−j = αe
∗
t . In conclusion, both approaches (as well
as their combination) generate the same efficiency target. Using Eq. (6), we can
write the optimal one-period efficiency target per unit of output as:13
X∗ =
(
EˆT + EˆP
)
s(p∗t , q∗t )
=
e∗t
s(p∗t , q∗t )
=
8
[
1− α (1− δj)]
θ3
. (11)
13This is optimal in the sense that the regulatory mechanism perfectly incorporates the level
of efficiency that firms would be able to achieve to maximize their profits in the absense of
regulation.
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Proposition 2 The optimal efficiency target decreases with persistent efficiency
(α) if the discount factor (δ) on future earnings is less than 1.
Both mechanisms to set efficiency targets are designed in accordance with
attainable cost reductions. The rent of local monopolies in the market for elec-
tricity distribution can then be fully extracted to improve consumer welfare.
Transient and persistent efficiency gains are fully internalized. The regulator is
aware that part of the efficiency target can only be achieved in period t+ 1 + j,
when all the benefits generated by the efficiency effort in period t + 1 can be
exploited. Therefore, the regulator can measure the persistent component cor-
rectly and estimate total efficiency targets achievable in each period. However,
this result may be undermined when information on the effects of efficiency effort
is incomplete and different types of inefficiency are unobservable.
2.1.2 Imperfect information
If the regulator ignores persistent inefficiency, the estimates of the achievable
efficiency target in a price cap environment can be wrong. Consequently, this
may lead to quality distortion. Let us assume that the regulation authority is
completely ignorant about persistency, i.e. the estimated level of α is αˆ = 0.
Since the delayed effects of today’s efficiency effort are neglected, the efficiency
target is obtained by substituting α=0 into Eq. (11) as follows:
X |αˆ=0= EˆT |αˆ=0
s(p∗t , q∗t )
=
e∗t |αˆ=0
s(p∗t , q∗t )
> X∗. (12)
An important implication of imperfect information on efficiency structure is
that service quality may be undermined. From Eq. (6) we can see that
∂q∗t+1/∂X < 0. (13)
Since efficiency gains are overestimated, the regulator imposes a tighter price cap.
This decreases the marginal benefits of quality and, therefore, the equilibrium
level of quality will be lower. Consequently, tighter quality controls are required
to avoid too low quality levels.
Whenever some degree of persistent efficiency is present, the regulator cannot
set optimal efficiency targets. Even when the regulator is not completely ignorant
about the persistent component, efficiency targets will have perverse incentives.
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The underestimation of persistency (αˆ < α) will generally be detrimental for
service quality:
X |αˆ<α= EˆT + EˆP |αˆ<α
s(p∗t , q∗t )
=
e∗t |αˆ<α
s(p∗t , q∗t )
> X∗ ⇒ q∗t+1
(
Xˆ
)
< q∗t+1 (X
∗) . (14)
Since the price-cost margin is also reduced and profitability is more likely under
pressure, firms may postpone important expenditures that may result in persist-
ing poor quality service. Conversely, the overestimation of persistency (αˆ > α)
will give more rent to the monopolistic firm:
X |αˆ>α= EˆT + EˆP |αˆ>α
s(p∗t , q∗t )
=
e∗t |αˆ>α
s(p∗t , q∗t )
< X∗ ⇒ pi∗t+1
(
Xˆ
)
> pi∗t+1 (X
∗) . (15)
Although quality is higher, overall consumer benefits are lower since the regulator
is not successful in extracting the rent from electricity distribution companies.
Proposition 3 It is impossible to achieve optimal efficiency targets if the reg-
ulator is imperfectly informed on persistent efficiency. Underestimation of per-
sistent efficiency leads firms to postpone expenditures, which worsens service
quality. Overestimation of persistent efficiency will increase monopoly rents.
2.1.3 Quality standards
Usually, under price cap regulation and unobservable quality aspects the regula-
tor may consider an additional instrument to regulate firms: Minimum Quality
Standards (MQS). These standards can be implemented by periodical controls
on service quality to avoid that the price cap mechanism leads to lower quality,
i.e. below the socially optimal level of quality or some other satisfactory level of
quality.
The combination of price cap and MQS mechanism applies to the case of
electricity distribution companies in New Zealand (Shen and Yang, 2012; New
Zealand Commerce Commission, 2015). Firms are subject to regulation under
the Commerce Act 1986, which defines a price and quality threshold regime since
2001. This regulatory mechanism identifies companies whose performance may
warrant further examination. Quality thresholds are based on two criteria: re-
liability and engagement with consumers to determine their demand for service
quality. The reliability criterion requires that unplanned interruptions should
not exceed the previous five-year averages. The interruption indicators used are
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SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index - minutes per connected
customer) and SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index - interrup-
tions per connected customer). Since 2010, a more rigorous system is in place
based on Default Price-quality Path (DPP) and Customized Price-quality path
(CPP).
The socially optimal level of quality is used as a reference for instance by the
regulator in Norway. In the Norwegian regulation scheme, the network compa-
nies’ revenue caps are adjusted by quality, i.e. in accordance with the customers’
interruption costs (Kjølle et al., 2008). From Eq. (3), we can obtain a welfare
function by adding the consumer surplus, CSt =
∞∑
t=k
δt−k 12(θ− pt)s(pt, qt).14 For
γ = 0, welfare is maximized at q∗∗t =
1
2θ
2 > q∗t =
1
4θ
2. To show the possible
implications of persistent efficiency under MQS mechanisms, let us assume that
service quality can be affected by exogenous shocks (interruptions). Therefore,
the true level of quality is:
q∗t+1 = qˆt+1 + ˜, (16)
where qˆt+1 is the observed level of service quality and ˜ is the exogenous shock
distributed as:
˜ ∈ {,−}, Pr[˜ = ] = ρ, Pr[˜ = −] = 1− ρ, (17)
where the probability ρ is unknown to the regulator.
Because of exogenous interruptions, the regulator can only verify if the ob-
served level of quality is in the “optimal” range q∗∗t −  ≤ qˆt+1 ≤ q∗∗t + .
Since an observed level of quality below q∗t is tolerated if it is not too low,
i.e. qˆt+1 ≥ q∗∗t −  = qmin, this provides room for speculation by electricity dis-
tribution companies. Under pressure, companies may be more prone to rely on
positive shocks, thus speculating on the expected level of service quality. Indeed,
the expected level of observable quality is:
qˆt+1 = ρ(q
∗
t+1 + ) + (1− ρ)(q∗t+1 − ) = q∗t+1 + (2ρ− 1). (18)
This may fall below qmin if:
q∗t+1 + (2ρ− 1) < q∗∗t − , (19)
14We assume a fixed cost of regulation enforcement.
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which depends on the efficiency target X. Indeed, using Eq. (6) and the socially
optimal level of quality q∗∗t = θ2/2, we can write the inequality (19) as:
θ2
4
[
1− 1
2
(1−X)2
]
> ρ, (20)
which is more likely to be satisfied (i.e. quality below the minimum) for higher
values of the efficiency target (X), smaller shocks () and lower probability (ρ)
of positive shocks (i.e. higher probability of interruptions). Remember that
the presence of persistent efficiency reduces the optimal efficiency target (see
Proposition 2) Therefore, when the regulator ignores or underestimates persistent
efficiency, wrong (too high) efficiency targets may increase violations of MQS,
ceteris paribus, leading to delayed expenditures and poorer quality in the future.
Proposition 4 If persistent efficiency is underestimated or completely ignored
and service quality is imperfectly observed, firms are less likely to comply with
Minimum Quality Standards.
3 Empirical exercise: cost model specification and
estimation method
Our theoretical model hypothesizes that there are two components of inefficiency.
If the authority neglects these components, the effectiveness of the regulation
may be undermined. Consequently, the effort to separate transient and persis-
tent inefficiency could improve the performance of the electricity distribution
market. In the following empirical analysis, we show that data availability and
the application of econometric models allow to disentangle transient and per-
sistent inefficiency. Moreover, we provide some evidence that the presence of
persistent efficiency may result in poorer quality levels.
The total cost of an electricity distribution company can be specified as a
function of input prices and outputs. Moreover, as discussed in Filippini and
Wetzel (2014) and in previous studies on the cost structure of electricity dis-
tribution companies, in the cost model specification it is important to include
a number of output characteristic variables.15 These variables should take into
account the heterogeneity of the electricity distribution companies’ production
environment.
15For a discussion on the estimation of cost functions in the energy sector see Farsi and
Filippini (2009).
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Generally, the explanatory variables considered in the specification of a cost
function for electricity distribution companies are: the quantity of electricity
distributed, the number of customers and the factor prices, some output charac-
teristics such as customer density, network size, service area, service quality and
load factor.
In this analysis, we specify a total cost function with two outputs and three
output characteristics. Unfortunately, the cost model specification does not in-
clude input prices since these data are lacking. Consequently, we hypothesize
that all electricity distribution companies are exposed to the same input prices.16
The total cost can be written as:
TC = c (Y,CU,NL,LF,Q, T ) , (21)
where Y and CU represent the output measured by the electricity supplied in
kilowatt-hours and the number of final consumers, respectively. NL, LF and Q
are output characteristics: NL is the network length, LF denotes the load factor,
and Q is service quality measured by SAIDI, an index of the average interrup-
tion duration of the system. Finally, T is a time trend that captures changes
in the cost over time. In order to be able to compute three type of economies,
i.e. economies of output density, economies of customers’ density and economies
of scale, we use the network length instead of customer density previously used
by Filippini and Wetzel (2014). As indicated by the microeconomic theory of
production, the cost function should be concave in input prices, non-decreasing
in input prices and output, and linearly homogeneous in input prices.
For the estimation of the cost function (21), we use a translog functional form.
The translog has the advantage that it does not impose a priori restrictions on the
nature of the technology. However, in case the model specification includes some
variables relatively highly correlated, then the estimation of the translog cost
function can suffer from multicollinearity. In our case, some of the explanatory
variables, such as the number of customers, the network length and the load
factor, are highly correlated and cause problems in the econometric estimation.
Therefore, we estimate a reduced version of the translog, where all interaction
16Clearly, we are aware that this is an important assumption. Note, however, that the
market for inputs in New Zealand is quite competitive and prices are expected to be similar
across distribution companies. The assumption is also used in previous studies as well as by
the regulator.
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variables have been dropped. Based on Eq. (21) the reduced translog cost
function can be expressed as:
lnTCit = β0 + βY lnYit + βCU lnCUit + βLF lnLFit + βQ lnQit+
+ βNL lnNLit +
1
2
βY Y (lnYit)
2 +
1
2
βCUCU (lnCUit)
2+
+
1
2
βLFLF (lnLFit)
2 +
1
2
βQQ(lnQit)
2 +
1
2
βNLNL(lnNLit)
2+
+ βtTt + εit, (22)
where the subscripts i and t denote the firm and year, respectively; and the βs
are unknown parameters to be estimated. The error term in Eq. (22) is still
general and will be specified later from an econometric point of view.
As discussed in more details in Filippini and Greene (2015), several different
panel data stochastic frontier models (SFA) can be used to estimate the level
of productive efficiency. Some of these models estimate the persistent part of
the level of productive efficiency. Others estimate the transient component.
Moreover, some recent developed models provide information on whether a firm
is characterized by the presence of both types of productive inefficiency.
In this paper, we decided to use three alternative stochastic frontier models:
two classical models and one relatively new model. The first model is the ba-
sic version of the random effects model proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) (RE
hereafter); the second model is the so-called true random effects model (TRE
hereafter) proposed by Greene (2005a, 2005b); and the third model is the gen-
eralized true random effects model (GTRE) recently introduced by Colombi et.
al. (2014) and Filippini and Greene (2015).
The random effects model introduced by Pitt and Lee (1981) interprets the
individual random effects as inefficiency rather than unobserved heterogeneity
as in the traditional literature on panel data models. This model provides in-
formation on the persistent part of the inefficiency in the use of energy. One
problem with the RE is that any unobserved, time-invariant, group-specific un-
observed heterogeneity is considered as inefficiency. As a result, this model tends
to underestimate the level of persistent efficiency in the use of energy.
The TRE proposed by Greene (2005a and 2005b) extends the SFA model in
its original form (Aigner, et al., 1977) by adding an individual random effect in
the model. In general terms, for the TRE the constant term, β0, in Eq. (22),
is replaced with a series of firm-specific random effects. This model has the
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advantage that controls for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time.
However, any time-invariant component of inefficiency is completely absorbed in
the firm-specific constant terms. Therefore, the TRE tends to underestimate the
level of inefficiency. Generally, the TRE provide information on the time-varying
part of the inefficiency.
The third model (GTRE) offers the possibility to estimate at the same time
the persistent and transient part of inefficiency. Colombi et al. (2014) have
provided a theoretical platform on which to distinguish persistent from transient
inefficiency. Filippini and Greene (2015) suggest a practical completion to the
development by proposing a straightforward, transparent empirical estimation
method of the GTRE.
Table 1 summarizes the three econometric specifications used in this empirical
part of the paper.
4 Data
The data set used in this study is a panel of 28 New Zealand’s electricity distri-
bution businesses (EDBs) between 1996 and 2011.17 The panel is constructed
mainly by exploiting information in the ”NZ EDB Database” from Economic In-
sights (Economic Insights, 2009). This database consists of financial and produc-
tion data on electricity distribution companies. As required by the New Zealand
electricity regulation, financial and production data are yearly published in the
Electricity Information Disclosures.
In terms of the number of connected customers, the size of companies in our
sample varies between 4,100 and 680,000. Total cost is defined as the sum of
variable cost and capital cost. Regrettably, consistent information on capital
cost for the whole period under observation are not present in the Electricity
Information Disclosures. Therefore, we use the so-called optimized deprival value
(ODV), which is the annual monetary value of the system fixed assets. The ODV
captures the loss of value that a company would bear if deprived of assets.18 To
measure the cost of capital, we follow Lawrence (2003) and Lawrence et al. (2009)
and set a common depreciation rate of 4.5 percent of ODV and an opportunity
17Few companies have been excluded because of lack of information. Further, a new company
recently established has been excluded because of too few years of operation.
18The ODV methodology used for asset valuations in the New Zealand’s electricity distribu-
tion sector is described in detail by the New Zealand Commerce Commission (2004).
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cost rate of 8 percent of ODV. Consequently, capital cost is nearly 12.5 percent
of the annual ODV.19 Total cost is adjusted for inflation using the consumer
price index for New Zealand provided by the OECD (base 2005).
In addition to the input and output variables, we consider three network
characteristics: the load factor, network quality and network length. The load
factor captures the intensity in utilization of the distribution network. This
is measured by the ratio between the electricity supplied and the maximum
distribution transformer demand multiplied by the total number of hours in one
year. Lower costs are expected for distribution companies with higher rates of
network utilization. Therefore, the estimated coefficient of the load factor is
expected to show a negative sign.
The network quality characteristic is measured by SAIDI. This is the average
number of interruption minutes for a consumer within a given period. The impact
of SAIDI on total costs is rather unclear. On the one hand, higher quality, that
is a lower SAIDI, may require more investments and hence may induce higher
capital costs. The higher quality may also lead to lower operational costs. For
the estimation of our models, we decided to use a weighted level of quality instead
of the actual level of quality. During the period under study, the regulator in
New Zealand set a minimum level of quality using the previous five-year average
of SAIDI. By using the regulated level of SAIDI, we can limit the endogeneity
problem related to quality and take into account the relatively high volatility of
SAIDI.
Finally, the network length is measured in kilometers to approximate the
service area size. We expect a positive coefficient, indicating that companies
with a larger area size operate at higher costs than companies with smaller
area size do. Some descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study are
provided in Table 2.
5 Results
The estimation results for the three models are given in Table 3. These results
show that the coefficients of output, number of customers and network length are
19Clearly, the limitations arising from the use of ODV as a proxy for capital cost are not
ignored. Nevertheless, in the absence of a consistent alternative measure this is plausibly the
best proxy for capital cost.
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positive and significant across all different estimators. In general, the estimated
coefficients are relatively similar across the estimators, except for the coefficients
of the two outputs and the coefficient of quality.
Since total costs and regressors are in logarithms and normalized, the first
order coefficients are interpretable as cost elasticities evaluated at the sample
median. All these coefficients have the expected sign and are highly significant.
For instance, the output coefficients suggest that the increase in costs due to
a one percent increase in the number of Kwh of electricity distributed, keeping
all other explanatory variables constant, varies between 0.16 and 0.33 percent.
The coefficient of the network length suggests that the increase in costs due to
a one percent extension in the network, keeping all other explanatory variables
constant, is approximately 0.2 percent. Further, the coefficient of the number
of customers suggests that the increase in costs due to a one percent increase in
the number of customers, keeping all other explanatory variables constant, varies
between 0.36 and 0.52 percent. The coefficient of the time trend is positive and
indicates that total costs of electricity companies increased over time. The cost
elasticity with respect to the load factor is negative in all specifications of the
cost model, indicating that a 1 percent improvement in the load factor reduces
costs by approximately 0.1 percent. Finally, the quality index measured by the
regulated level of interruptions (SAIDI) has a negative and significant impact
on costs, though this impact is quite small. A 1 percent decrease in quality (i.e.
higher number of interruptions) decreases costs between 0.01 and 0.03 percent,
ceteris paribus. This suggests that reducing service quality allows firms to save
on costs.
5.1 Persistent and transient efficiency
The firm’s inefficiency for the RE and the TRE models are estimated using the
conditional mean of the inefficiency term proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982).
Following Filippini and Greene (2015) and using a result from Colombi (2010)
based on the moment generating function for the closed skew normal distribution,
we compute the inefficiency scores.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the cost efficiency estimates for the
28 electricity distribution companies obtained from the econometric estimation
of the three models. The estimation results for the new cost frontier model
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(GTRE) provide estimates of the persistent (PGTRE) as well as the transient
component of cost efficiency (TGTRE). The RE model produces values of the
cost efficiency that are time-invariant and, therefore, should reflect the persistent
part of the cost efficiency. On the other hand, the TRE model produces values
that are time varying and, therefore, should reflect the transient part of the cost
efficiency.
The values reported in Table 4 show that the estimated average values of the
persistent efficiency varies from 78 percent in the RE model to 88 percent in the
GTRE model. The estimated average values of the transient efficiency varies
from 94 percent in the TRE model to 88 percent in the GTRE model. The
values of the persistent and transient efficiency obtained by the GTRE model
compared to the values obtained by the TRE and RE models are significantly
different. This implies that the values obtained by the RE and TRE models do
not provide precise information on the level of persistent and transient efficiency.
Another interesting comparison across the models is the correlation between in-
efficiency scores. Although there are differences in the levels of inefficiency, small
differences are observed in terms of inefficiency ranking. Table 5 provides the cor-
relations between the estimated levels of cost efficiency obtained from the three
model specifications. The value of the correlation coefficients for the transient
cost efficiency obtained with TRE and GTRE models is relatively high (0.78).
However, the correlation between the values of the persistent cost efficiency ob-
tained with RE and GTRE models is relatively low (0.43). This suggests that
the result obtained with the RE model is not measuring the persistent efficiency
of the firms correctly. As suggested by Greene (2005b), the reason could be that
all unobserved time invariant heterogeneity in the RE model is captured by the
individual effect, which is also used to compute the level of efficiency.
The evidence on the presence of persistent efficiency casts doubts on the ef-
fectiveness of a price cap regulation that does not distinguish the two parts of
efficiency. As suggested by the theoretical model in Section 2 (Proposition 3),
when persistent efficiency is ignored the regulator may assume suboptimal effi-
ciency targets. Remember that the higher the share of the persistent component
of efficiency, αe∗, the lower the share of the transient component of efficiency,
(1-α)e∗. Moreover, errors in setting efficiency targets may increase with the size
of the persistent component as with respect to the transient component.
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5.2 Efficiency and quality
Theoretically, the regulatory implications of persistent inefficiency could be as-
sessed by comparing the regulated setting with an ideal setting without price
cap and quality regulation. Unfortunately, this experimental design cannot be
performed with our dataset. Still, some figures are worth discussing and maybe
can stimulate opportunities for future research.
Using the estimated levels of transient and persistent efficiency we can calcu-
late the ratio of the persistent component, α, assumed in the theoretical model
as:
EˆP
EˆP + EˆT
=
αe∗
αe∗ + (1− α)e∗ = α. (23)
The theoretical model suggests that, if the regulator is fully informed, service
quality is expected to increase with the persistent efficiency component because
of the relaxation of the efficiency target. In New Zealand, one of the objectives of
the regulator is to provide services at a quality that reflects consumer demand,
and the use of total factor productivity should allow setting efficiency targets
according to this objective (Brown and Moselle, 2008). Within this framework,
the regulator does not disentangle the two parts of efficiency, i.e. the persistent
and the transient components. Our results show a positive correlation between
the estimated level of persistent efficiency (α) and the estimated level of quality
measured by the inverse of SAIDI, although this correlation is very small (ρ =
0.05). However, the number of firms that do not comply with the regulated
quality level is remarkable.20 Around 37% of firms on average across the whole
period are below the regulated quality standard, ranging from a minimum of 15%
in 2001 and a maximum of 68% in 2007. Note that, according to Proposition 4, if
persistent efficiency is ignored the level of compliance may suffer. More evidence
is provided by the estimated level of α that appears to be negatively correlated
with quality compliance, though only weakly (ρ = −0.04). Therefore, our results
may suggest evidence of errors in the evaluation of persistent efficiency and the
setting of efficiency targets.
To further investigate this issue, we can build a measure of the information
bias in the estimation of persistent efficiency. We compare the estimates of ineffi-
20We calculated the level of quality compliance as the ratio (or the difference) between the
minimum quality standard (i.e. average interruptions measured by SAIDI in the previous five-
year) and current quality (current level of SAIDI).
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ciency from a conventional stochastic frontier pooled model (Aigner et al., 1977)
with the estimates of the GTRE model. In most countries (e.g. Austria and Ger-
many), national authorities adopt simple frontier models based on cross-section
OLS to estimate the level of efficiency of electricity distribution companies. This
may lead to biased results since persistent efficiency is not correctly taken into
account. Therefore, we can use the results of the GTRE model as a benchmark of
correct information on persistent efficiency and compare them with the efficiency
results of a pooled model that ignores the magnitude of persistent efficiency. In
this way, we obtain a proxy of the information bias in the estimation of persistent
efficiency. As expected, we observe that the larger the information bias the lower
is quality compliance. Although this correlation is small (ρ = −0.09), the result
may cast doubts on the ability of the regulator to ensure quality compliance
when an information bias is present on the estimation of persistent efficiency.
5.3 Economies of scale
The estimation results reported in Table 3 can also be used to compute the
value of the economies of scale. The inclusion of the number of customers and
the network length in the cost function allows for the distinction of economies of
output density, economies of customer density and economies of scale. Follow-
ing Roberts (1986) and Filippini (1998) we define economies of output density
(EOD) as the proportional increase in total costs brought about by a propor-
tional increase in output, holding all input prices, the load factor, the number of
customers and the network length fixed. This is equivalent to the inverse of the
elasticity of total costs with respect to output:
EODTC =
1
∂lnTC
∂lnY
. (24)
We find economies of output density if EOD is greater than 1 and, accord-
ingly, we identify diseconomies of output density if EOD is below 1. In the case
of EOD = 1, no economies or diseconomies of output density exist. Economies
of output density exist if the average cost of an electricity distribution utility
decreases as the volume of electricity sold to a fixed number of customers in a
service area of a given size increases. This measure is relevant to decide whether
side-by-side competition or local monopoly are the most efficient form in the
electricity distribution industry.
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Economies of customer density (ECD) are defined as the proportional in-
crease in total costs brought about by a proportional increase in output and the
number of customers, holding all input prices, the load factor and the network
length fixed. Therefore, economies of customer density can be defined as
ECDTC =
1
∂lnTC
∂lnY +
∂lnTC
∂lnCU
. (25)
There are economies of customer density if ECD is greater than 1 and, ac-
cordingly, we identify diseconomies of scale if ECD is below 1. In the case of
ECD = 1 no economies or diseconomies of customer density exist. This measure
is relevant for analyzing the cost of distributing more electricity to a fixed service
area as it becomes more densely populated.
Economies of scale (ES) are defined as the proportional increase in total costs
brought about by a proportional increase in output, the number of customers
and the size of the service area, holding all input prices and the load factor fixed.
Economies of scale (ES) can thus be defined as
ESTC =
1
∂lnTC
∂lnY +
∂lnTC
∂lnCU +
∂lnTC
∂lnNL
. (26)
There are economies of scale if ES is greater than 1 and, accordingly, we
identify diseconomies of scale if ES is below 1. In the case of ES = 1 no economies
or diseconomies of scale exist. This measure is relevant for analyzing the impact
on cost of merging two adjacent electricity distribution utilities.
Table 6 presents the estimates of economies of scale computed for a medium
sized firm.21 We note that the indicators for economies of scale computed, using
the results obtained from the variable cost frontier function, are greater than 1,
whereas the values of the economies of scale obtained from the total cost frontier
function are approximately equal to 1. However, since the total cost frontier
function considers all inputs as freely adjustable, this result may be imprecise.
For this reason, we tend to support the hypothesis that the electricity distribution
sector is characterized by economies of scale.
21Equations (24), (25) and (26) have been evaluated at the values for the load factor, SAIDI
and consumer density of the median company. For the interpretation of the results, it is
important to note that a proportional increase in electricity supplied and number of consumers
implies, keeping the value of the consumer density constant, an increase in the network length.
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6 Conclusions
The level of productive efficiency of a firm can be split in two parts: a persistent
and a transient component. This distinction can be important in the application
of incentive-based regulation schemes, such as the price cap that uses inefficiency
scores in the definition of prices in water, electricity and telecommunication
sectors. If the regulator ignores or underestimates persistent efficiency, efficiency
targets can be wrongly set. As a consequence, this may lead to quality distortion
and lower quality compliance.
Generally, the empirical literature on efficiency analysis of firms has not paid
a lot of attention to the distinction between these two components. Some scholars
(Colombi et al., 2014; Kumbhakar and Tsionas, 2012; Kumbhakar et al., 2012;
Filippini and Greene, 2015) have recently proposed econometric approaches to
provide separate estimates of the two components of efficiency. Some of these
approaches are relatively cumbersome or are based on a multistep manipulation
of OLS that is not completely satisfactory. In this paper, we apply the esti-
mator proposed by Filippini and Greene (2015) to assess the level of persistent
and transient efficiency in the New Zealand electricity distribution sector. The
estimator is based on maximum simulated likelihood using all the sample distri-
butional information to obtain the estimates, and is very effective and strikingly
simple to apply.
The empirical results show that the transient and the persistent parts of
productive efficiency are relatively different in absolute value and differ from
productive efficiency measured by previous approaches. From a regulatory point
of view, following the theoretical model, the results imply that differentiated
measures of efficiency should be used in regulation. We found some weak evidence
that higher levels of persistent efficiency are positively correlated with quality
levels. However, electricity distribution companies seem to suffer systematically
from poor quality compliance. Moreover, quality compliance is weakly decreasing
with both persistent efficiency and the information bias of the regulator in the
estimation of persistent efficiency. Further research is needed to confirm these
preliminary findings.
22
References
Aigner D, Lovell CAK, Schmidt P (1977) Formulation and estimation of stochastic
frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics 6(1):21-37
Bernstein JI, Sappington DEM (1999) Setting the X factor in price-cap regulation plans.
Journal of Regulatory Economics 16:5-25
Brown T, Moselle B (2008) Use of total factor productivity analyses in network regula-
tion case studies of regulatory practice. The Brattle Group Ltd.
Cowan SGB (1997a) Tight average revenue regulation can be worse than no regulation.
The Journal of Industrial Economics 45 (1):75-88
Cowan SGB (1997b) Price-cap regulation and inefficiency in relative pricing. Journal
Regulatory Economics 12:53-70
Colombi R (2010) A skew normal stochastic frontier model for panel data. Proceedings
of the 45th Scientific Meeting of the Italian Statistical Society, University of Padua, June
29-July 1
Colombi R, Kumbhakar SC, Martini G, Vittadini G (2014) Closed-skew normality in
stocastic frontiers with individual effects and long/short-run efficiency. Journal of Pro-
ductivity Analysis 42:123-136
Di Giorgio L, Filippini M, Masiero G (2015) Structural and managerial cost differences
in nonprofit nursing homes. Economic Modelling 51:289-298
Economic Insights (2009) Economic Insights NZ EDB Database. http://www.com-
com.govt.nz/assets/Imported-from-old-site/industryregulation/Electricity/PriceQuality-
Paths/ContentFiles/Documents/comcom-economicinsightedbdatabaseandanalysisdatafi-
les-aug2009.zip, accessed February 2012
Farsi M, Filippini M (2009) An analysis of cost efficiency in Swiss multi-utilities. Energy
Economics 31(2):306-315
Filippini M, Greene W (2015) Persistent and transient productive inefficiency: a maxi-
mum simulated likelihood approach. Journal of Productivity Analysis 1-10, DOI 10.1007-
/s11123-015-0446-y1-10.
Filippini M, Wetzel H (2014) The impact of ownership unbundling on cost efficiency:
Empirical evidence from the New Zealand electricity distribution sector. Energy Eco-
nomics 45:412-418
Greene W (2005a) Reconsidering heterogeneity in panel data estimators of the stochastic
frontier model. Journal of Econometrics 126(2):269-303
23
Greene W (2005b) Fixed and random effects in stochastic frontier models. Journal of
Productivity Analysis 23(1):7-32
Jondrow J, Knox Lovell CA, Materov IS, Schmidt P (1982) On the estimation of technical
inefficiency in the stochastic frontier production function model. Journal of Economet-
rics 19(2-3):233-238
Joskow PL, Schmalensee R (1986) Incentive regulation for electric utilities. Yale Journal
on Regulation 4:1
Kjølle GH, Samdal K, Singh B, Kvitastein OA (2008) Customer costs related to inter-
ruptions and voltage problems: Methodology and results. IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, 23(3):1030-1038
Kumbhakar SC, Lien G, Hardaker JB (2012) Technical efficiency in competing panel
data models: a study of Norwegian grain farming. Journal of Productivity Analysis
41(2):321-337
Kumbhakar SC, Tsionas EG (2012) Firm heterogeneity, persistent and transient tech-
nical inefficiency: A generalized true random effects model. Journal of Applied Econo-
metrics 29(1):110-132
Iossa E, Stroffolini F (2002) Price cap regulation and information acquisition. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 20:1013-1036
Laffont J-J, Tirole J (1993) A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. MIT
press
Lawrence D (2003) Regulation of electricity lines businesses, analysis of lines business
performance 19962003. Report prepared by Meyrick and Associates for the New Zealand
Commerce Commission
Lawrence D, Diewert E, Fallon J, Kain J (2009) Electricity distribution industry produc-
tivity analysis: 19962008. Report prepared by Economic Insights for the New Zealand
Commerce Commission
New Zealand Commerce Commission (2004) Handbook for optimised deprival valuation
of system fixed assets of electricity lines businesses
New Zealand Commerce Commission (2015) Regulated Industries: Electricity archive.
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/regulated-industries/electricity/, accessed September 2015
Nillesen PHL, Pollitt MG (2011) Ownership unbundling in electricity distribution: em-
pirical evidence from New Zealand. Review of Industrial Organization 38:61-93
Pitt MM, Lee L-F (1981) The measurement and sources of technical inefficiency in the
Indonesian weaving industry. Journal of Development Economics 9(1):43-64
24
Ramos-Real FJ (2005) Cost functions and the electric utility industry. A contribution
to the debate on deregulation. Energy Policy 33(1):69-87
Roberts MJ (1986) Economies of density and size in the production and delivery of
electric power. Land Economics 378-387.
Shen D, Yang Q (2012) Electricity market regulation reform and competition - Case
study of the New Zealand electricity market, In: Wu Y, Shi X, Kimura F (eds) Energy
market integration in East Asia: Theories, electricity sector and substitutes, ERIA
Research Project Report 2011-17, Jakarta, pp. 103-139
Scully GW (1999) Reform and efficiency gains in the New Zealand electrical supply
industry. Journal of Productivity Analysis 11(2):133-147
25
M
od
el
I
M
od
el
II
M
od
el
II
I
R
E
T
R
E
G
T
R
E
(P
it
t
a
n
d
L
ee
)
M
od
el
ln
T
C
it
=
β
0
+
β
′ x
it
+
v i
t
+
u
i
ln
T
C
it
=
β
0
+
w
i
+
β
′ x
it
+
v i
t
+
u
it
ln
T
C
it
=
β
0
+
(w
i
−
h
i)
+
β
′ x
it
+
v i
t
+
u
it
F
u
ll
ra
n
d
o
m
ε i
t
=
u
i
+
v i
t
ε i
t
=
w
i
+
u
it
+
v i
t
ε i
t
=
w
i
+
h
i
+
u
it
+
v i
t
er
ro
r
ε i
t
u
i
∼
N
+
(0
,σ
2 u
)
u
it
∼
N
+
(0
,σ
2 u
)
u
it
∼
N
+
(0
,σ
2 u
)
v i
t
∼
N
(0
,σ
2 v
)
v i
t
∼
N
(0
,σ
2 v
)
h
i
∼
N
+
(0
,σ
2 h
)
w
i
∼
N
(0
,σ
2 w
)
v i
t
∼
N
(0
,σ
2 v
)
w
i
∼
N
(0
,σ
2 w
)
P
er
si
st
en
t
E
(u
i
|ε
i1
,.
..
,ε
iT
)
N
on
e
E
(h
i
|ε
it
)
in
effi
ci
en
cy
es
ti
m
a
to
r
T
ra
n
si
en
t
N
on
e
E
(u
it
|ε
it
)
E
(u
it
|ε
it
)
in
effi
ci
en
cy
es
ti
m
a
to
r
T
a
b
le
1:
E
co
n
om
et
ri
c
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
of
th
e
st
o
ch
as
ti
c
co
st
fr
on
ti
er
.
26
V
ar
ia
b
le
U
n
it
o
f
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
M
in
M
a
x
T
o
ta
l
co
st
(T
C
)
T
h
ou
sa
n
d
2
00
5$
38
.5
∗1
03
64
.0
∗1
03
3
.4
∗1
03
3
78
.0
∗1
03
E
le
ct
ic
it
y
su
p
p
li
ed
(Y
)
M
W
h
97
0.
5
∗1
06
17
53
.6
∗1
06
37
.9
∗1
06
10
70
0
.0
∗1
06
C
o
n
su
m
er
s
(C
U
)
N
u
m
b
er
62
77
5
11
43
87
41
0
8
6
79
61
2
L
oa
d
fa
ct
or
(L
F
)
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
62
.9
7.
8
30
.4
84
.7
S
A
ID
I
(Q
)
M
in
u
te
s
22
1.
4
19
2.
5
1
5.
0
1
91
8.
0
N
et
w
or
k
le
n
g
th
(N
L
)
K
m
51
47
.5
60
07
.3
23
9.
0
3
00
35
.5
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s:
n
=
3
0
5
T
ab
le
2:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
st
at
is
ti
cs
.
27
Variable RE TRE GTRE
β0 16.359 16.560 16.449
(499.981) (1474.362) (1380.217)
lnY 0.164 0.241 0.330
(1.602) (11.657) (16.345)
lnCU 0.516 0.425 0.361
(4.210) (18.300) (16.140)
lnLF -0.139 -0.122 -0.144
(-1.190) (-2.785) (-3.478)
lnQ -0.011 -0.015 -0.025
(-0.580) (2.183) (3.816)
lnNL 0.210 0.207 0.213
(2.494) (15.017) (16.526)
lnY∗lnY 0.277 0.202 0.043
(1.147) (2.155) (0.460)
lnCU∗lnCU 0.424 0.326 0.211
(2.023) (3.435) (2.227)
lnLF∗lnLF -0.257 -0.164 -0.150
(-0.499) (-0.619) (-0.719)
lnQ∗lnQ 0.011 0.014 0.033
(0.335) (0.934) (2.421)
lnNL∗lnNL -0.143 -0.157 -0.181
(-1.686) (-15.810) (-18.351)
lnY∗lnCU -0.333 -0.232 -0.088
(-1.441) (-2.548) (-0.976)
T 0.020 0.020 0.021
(11.868) (22.558) (21.754)
σw - 0.192 0.189
- (36.563) (37.417)
λ 4.981 1.734 4.933
(2.030) (6.130) (6.320)
σ2 0.328 0.914 0.119
(4.489) (20.260) (21.530)
σh - - 0.888
- - (13.471)
Log likelihood 336.692 335.893 328.043
Table 3: Estimated first and second order coefficients from cost frontier models
(Asymptotic t-ratios in parentheses).
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
RE 0.782 0.143 0.515 0.984
TRE 0.940 0.032 0.803 0.987
TGTRE 0.878 0.062 0.644 0.990
PGTRE 0.884 0.021 0.866 0.946
Table 4: Cost efficiency scores.
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RE TRE TGTRE PGTRE
RE 1 0.031 -0.235 0.425
TRE 0.315 1 0.779 -0.069
TGTRE -0.235 0.779 1 -0.653
PGTRE 0.425 -0.069 -0.653 1
Table 5: Correlation coefficients.
Economy Economy Economy
of density of consumer density of scale
RE 6.089 1.470 1.123
TRE 4.142 1.698 1.127
GTRE 3.031 1.902 1.119
Table 6: Economies of scale.
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